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Abstract
While there has been a lot of research on nding and developing top per-
formers in the workplace, less attention has been paid to the question of how
to manage those workers who are harmful to organizational performance. In
extreme cases, in addition to hurting performance, such workers can gener-
ate enormous regulatory and legal liabilities for the rm. We explore a large
novel dataset of over 50,000 workers across 11 di¤erent rms to document a
variety of aspects of workerscharacteristics and circumstances that lead them
to engage in "toxic" behavior. We also nd that avoiding a toxic worker (or
converting him to an average worker) enhances performance to a much greater
extent than replacing an average worker with a superstar worker.
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1 Introduction
There is an abundance of work that explores how to nd, develop, and incentivize
top performers so as to enhance organizational performance (Lazear and Oyer (2007)
and Gibbons and Roberts (2013)). What this work makes clear is that hiring the
right people is very important. Finding the positive outliers the "stars" can sub-
stantially increase performance (e.g., Azoulay et al. (2010), Sauermann and Cohen
(2010), and Oettl (2012)). However, there are outliers from the other side of the
distribution that are much less studied: those workers who are harmful to an or-
ganizations performance (Banerjee et al. (2012) and Pierce and Balasubramanian
(2015)). At their most harmless, these workers could simply be a bad t, leading to
premature termination and a costly search for and training of a new worker. How-
ever, more damaging to the rm is a worker who engages in behavior that adversely
a¤ects fellow workers or other company assets; we label this type of worker "toxic."
A toxic worker may engage in sexual harassment, workplace violence, fraud,or some
other breach of important company policy or governmental law. In its most dramatic
form, such worker misconduct can cost a rm billions of dollars, as evidenced by JP
Morgans "London Whale" incident with Bruno Iksil.1 At another extreme, such
workers can even mortally harm current or past colleagues, as tragically witnessed in
the fatal shooting of WDBJ-TV reporters by their former colleague.2 But even rela-
tively modest levels of toxic behavior can cause major organizational cost, including
customer loss, loss of employee morale, increased turnover, and loss of legitimacy
among important external stakeholders (Robinson and Bennett (1995), Litzky et al.
(2006), Ermongkonchai (2010) and MacLean et al. (2010)).
The causes of worker misconduct are varied. There is consistent evidence that
incentives can play a very important role in causing adverse outcomes (e.g., see
Oberholzer-Gee and Wulf (2012), Larkin (2014), and Minor (2014)). There is also
1See http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/the-london-whale. In this case, it was ulti-
mately not Mr. Iksil himself who was charged (he cooperated with authorities), but rather his
supervisor and junior trader.
2http://www.cbsnews.com/news/virginia-wdbj-station-shooting-alleged-gunman-posted-video-
of-shooting-on-social-media/
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evidence suggesting that a workers personal characteristics are important in deter-
mining his ethical behavior (e.g., see Ford and Richardson (1994) and Loe et al.
(2000)). Lazear and Oyer (2007) suggest that the selection of workers plays a role
at least as important, if not more important than incentives in generating outcomes.
Thus, one approach to managing toxic workers and the approach we focus on in
this paper is simply avoiding them. However, in order to do so, we must be able to
identify them ahead of time. By exploring the actual conduct and characteristics of
many workers that are quasi-randomly placed across and within di¤erent organiza-
tions, we identify several individual predictors of toxic workers: overcondence, poor
service-orientation, and a vision of themselves as rule followers.
In addition to these predictors, we also nd evidence that an employees work en-
vironment contributes to the likelihood of him becoming a toxic worker (e.g., Vardi
(2001) , Greve et al. (2010), and Pierce and Snyder (2014)). Our paper complements
the work of Pierce and Snyder (2014) who show that in the setting of automobile
emissions testing a workers environment has signicant e¤ects on her individual
ethical conduct. Moreover, alongside showing that this environmental e¤ect is also
present in a broader setting, we are able to compare the importance of an individuals
characteristics and identify which individual characteristics matter in determining
outcomes, which adds substantially to our explanatory power. Pierce and Snyders
(2014) ndings about the impact of workplace environment, while important, ex-
plained only the minority of the variation of outcomes.
We also document other features of toxic workers. Specically, we nd that toxic
workers produce greater output than the average worker. Thus, as in Gino and Ariely
(2012) and Frank and Obloj (2014), we nd that there is a potential trade-o¤ when
employing an unethical person: they are corrupt, but they excel in work performance.
This might explain how a toxic worker can persist in an organization. However, we
nd that when their productivity is examined more closely, their quality of work is
subpar. Thus, they produce at a faster rate, but at lower quality than their average
non-toxic peers.
Finally, we estimate the value of nding a "superstar," dened as workers in the
top 1% of productivity, versus the value of avoiding a toxic worker. Succeeding in
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the latter generates returns of nearly two-to-one compared to those generated when
rms hire a superstar. This suggests more broadly that "bad" workers may have a
stronger e¤ect on the rm than "good" workers. In many other elds and disciplines
researchers have found that a negative has a stronger impact than a positive. For
example, in the domain of nance, loss aversion recognizes that in terms of magnitude
losses have more of an impact than gains (see Tversky & Kahneman (1992)). In the
discipline of psychology it is a generally accepted principle that bad experiences have
a stronger hold on our psyches than good ones (Baumeister et al. (2001)). Finally, in
the eld of linguistics, it has been found that humans preferentially attend to negative
words over positive or neutral ones (Estes and Adelman (2008)). It is no surprise to
us that these ndings hold true in the eld of human resource management, as well.
Much of the past research on unethical worker conduct has been based on surveys,
self-reports, and intention-based outcomes (Weaver and Trevino (1999) and Green-
berg (2002)). Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) suggest that the mixed results of
this past work likely stem from the challenge of empirically examining subjective
data. For our setting, we dene toxic workers as those who are actually terminated
for toxic behavior. Thus, this paper complements this important work by linking
personal characteristics of workers quasi-randomly placed within organizations with
objective conduct outcomes across a very large, novel data set.
An alternative to avoiding toxic workers altogether, is to reform those already
in the organization. With resource constraints it may not be feasible for some, if
not most, organizations to pursue this second path. However, since we nd that a
workers environment is also important in inuencing toxic outcomes, there is some
hope that through judicious management of a workers environment, toxicity can
be reduced. Nonetheless, further exploring this channel is beyond the scope of the
current paper.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a
theoretical understanding of the problem of toxic workers and explores how we can
identify their origins. Section Three presents our main empirical results. Section
Four provides a discussion, and our nal section concludes.
4
2 Theoretical Considerations: The Person and the
Situation
In this section, we consider a simple theoretical setting to illustrate the link between
theory and our identication strategy. We begin by assuming a simple world in which
all workers are the same and all environments are the same. That is, the person and
the situation are always the same. This will serve as a baseline that will then be
modied by allowing for di¤erent individuals and di¤erent situations one at a time.
In this setting, all workers can engage in toxic behavior in a given period. Once they
engage in such behavior, they are dubbed a toxic worker.3
First assume that P represents the probability that a person will engage in some
toxic behavior4 in a given period. In a workers rst period, she has a P chance of
engaging in toxic behavior. This means that she has a 1   P chance of working in
the next period, assuming a toxic worker is removed from the worker pool. Hence,
the chance that a worker makes it beyond period t is (1  P )t ; 5 which we denote
as the survival rate S (t) : In contrast, the chance that a worker does not make it to
period t is 1   (1  P )t ; which we denote as the failure rate F (t) : Recall that the
hazard rate, where f (t) is the density of F (t) ; is then dened as
3In the general case, with di¤erent individuals and situations, it makes more sense to dene toxic
workers as those who are more likely to engage in toxic behavior than those who or not. However,
here all workers are toxic workers in that sense, so we use the term toxic worker to denote when
such a worker actively engages in toxic behavior.
4Here, and throughout when we use the term toxic behavior, we are assuming the kind of
behavior that is observable (or that its e¤ects are observable).
5Note that with this setup it is equivalent to assume that workers have a constant propensity
to engage in misconduct and nally do so in a given period with probability P; after which they
are removed from the worker pool, and to assume that workers always engage in a constant level
of misconduct and are nally caught and removed with probability P: For this study, what we will
actually observe is the removal of a worker (i.e., a termination) who has engaged in toxic behavior.
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h (t) :=
f (t)
S (t)
=
  ln (1  P )t (1  P )t
(1  P )t
=   ln (1  P )t :
The hazard rate tells us the chance that a worker will be a toxic worker at
time t, given that she has not yet been toxic up until time t: Not only is this an
intuitive measure to consider, but there is a long, rich history of estimating hazard
rates. In this simple setup of a constant chance of engaging in toxic behavior for
all periods, for all people and all situations, the hazard rate would then simple be a
linearly increasing function of time, since   ln (1  P )t =  t ln (1  P ) : Of course,
in practice, we do not expect this to be true. In fact, we expect that the hazard
rate is likely a very complex function. For example, even if all people and situations
were the same, it could take more than one period for a worker to engage in toxic
behavior; perhaps it takes more than one period to learn about and take advantage
of an opportunity. In this case, P would increase over time. Alternatively, perhaps
a person is more likely to engage in toxic behavior during the formative days and
months at a new position; as time passes, she becomes better integrated and less
likely to be toxic. Many other possibilities abound. Thus, it seems important not to
assume some ex-ante relationship between time and the hazard rate. In our setting,
we will refrain from making this assumption for our baseline hazard rate by instead
specifying an overall hazard rate of engaging in toxicity for a particular person over
time as
h (t) f (tjX) ;
where h (t) is allowed to have an arbitrary relationship between the hazard rate
and time and can be viewed as the average relationship between time and the hazard
rate. In contrast, the function f (tjX) takes on a value greater or less than 1 as a
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function of (potentially) both the person and situation across time. In this sense,
this approach follows the spirit of Trevino (1986) to simultaneously consider both
the person and the situation. Specically, f (tjX) is a function of the person and
the situation at time t; which are captured by the matrix X. In its simplest form,
we could assume a world with workers that are sometimes toxic at a periodic rate
of h (t) and another set of workers who are never toxic. Thus, f (tjX) would simply
be an indicator function, taking on the value of 1 or 0; depending on whether the
worker is toxic.
For a richer example, assume after 365 days that an average remaining worker
has a 5% chance of engaging in toxic behavior on day 366; this means h (366) = :05:
However, this chance could increase or decrease as a function of the honesty of a
particular worker, as well as her job position. The function f (tjX) is then greater
or less than 1 depending on the person (e.g., her level of honesty) and the situation
(e.g., her particular job position) at a particular point in time. This exible setup
allows us to model a myriad of real-world settings and is the approach we will use
in our estimation, as outlined below. However, rst we consider some settings of
the person and the situation that we can both measure in our study and expect to
matter in terms of outcome.
2.1 Factors of the Person and the Situation
In principle, there are some identiable factors that are likely to predict toxic behav-
ior, especially when studying actual outcomes. Here we discuss those that we can
measure in our data. The empirical proxies for these factors are discussed in section
3.1.
It is well established that other-regarding preferences determine the kinds of
actions people choose and that people have heterogenous levels of other-regardingness
(e.g., see Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman, Kariv and Markovitz (2007)).
All things equal, those that are less other-regarding should be more predisposed to
toxicity, as they do not fully internalize the cost that their behavior imposes on others.
A way to capture ones degree of other-regardingness is to identify how concerned
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one is about taking care of anothers needs. Those that are service-oriented exhibit
care for the needs of others. In contrast, those that show little concern for anothers
interests are less likely to refrain from damaging others and their property. Thus,
ceterus paribus, those with poor service-orientation should be more likely to engage
toxic behavior.
Hypothesis 1: Workers with poor service orientation are more likely to
be toxic
Outside of the business ethics literature, there are also some consistent ndings
that overcondence contributes to adverse behavior and outcomes. Petit and Bol-
laert (2011) document a set of important management and nance papers that have
established this link. Broadly, there at least two dimensions that might manifest
overcondence. Thus, toxic behavior should be increasing alongside a workers de-
gree of condence, holding all else constant.
Hypothesis 2: Overcondent workers are more likely to be toxic
An apparently straightforward factor for measuring the propensity of misconduct
is whether or not a worker agrees that rules should always be followed. It would seem
that those who always follow rules are likely to follow ethical rules, as well. However,
in certain situations, a rule might need to be broken, perhaps to do the "right thing."
History is replete with such examples, and it has become a self-evident truth that
some rules are meant to be broken. Thus, subjects who admit that sometimes rules
should be broken are likely more honest than those who maintain that rules should
always be followed. It also seems self-evident that those who are honest are less likely
to engage in misconduct, all things equal. Taken together, this suggests that those
claiming rules should always be followed are actually more likely to break the rules
via toxic conduct.
Hypothesis 3: Workers that claim the rules should never be broken are
more likely to be toxic
Possibly the most important factor in determining whether the work environment
will increase the likelihood of misconduct is the likelihood of the workers colleagues
to engage in toxic behavior. Pierce and Snyder (2008) nd strong evidence that there
are ethical-worker peer e¤ects, akin to productivity peer e¤ects. Thus, using Pierce
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and Snyders logic, increased exposure to toxicity should lead to more toxicity.
Hypothesis 4: Increased exposure to other toxic workers makes a worker
more likely to be toxic
Practically speaking, certain job positions are likely to lead to di¤erent levels of
toxic behavior. For example, some positions involve more regular contact with other
workers, which could increase or decrease the likelihood of toxicity based on the
behavior of those other workers. Furthermore, some positions are easier to monitor
than others; a highly un-monitored position may be more likely to breed toxicity.
There is also evidence that a job positions degree of task diversity can inuence
misconduct (Derer-Rozin et al. (2015)). Hence, the type of position a worker has,
ceterus paribus, should prove an important factor.
Hypothesis 5: A workers type of job position should a¤ect his likeli-
hood of toxicity
We now turn to our estimation strategy.
2.2 Estimation Strategy
For our empirical analysis, as with our theoretical discussion, we utilize a propor-
tional hazards model (see Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). This allows us to avoid
assumptions about the shape of the base hazard rate h (t) over time. We then as-
sume that this base hazard is modied by
f (tjX)  epxp;t+sxs;t ;
where xp;t is a vector of personal traits at time t and xs;t is a vector of situation
characteristics at time t: The role of e is simply to ensure that the composite hazard
rate h (t) f (tjX) is never negative.6 In other words, the baseline hazard rate h (t)
can be any arbitrary shape over time, but it may be modied by the person and
6Precisely, we need the image of f (tjX) to be in the set R+ [ f0g, since it must be that
h (t) f (tjX) 2 [0;+1):
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situation at time t by f (tjX).
This setup then gives us the following partial log-likelihood function to maximize:
logL =
DX
j=1
24X
i2Dj
xi   dj log
8<:X
k2Rj
exk
9=;
35 ;
where i indexes subjects, xi is a vector of covariates representing the person and
the situation, j indexes failure times in chronological order, Dj is the set of dj failures
at time j; and Rj is the set of all subjects that could potentially fail at time j:
In our empirical setting, we have both many types of workers across workgroups
and quasi-random matching to workgroups. Company executives explain that the
typical worker placement process is a function of periodic work ow and other forces,
which are not predictable. We will show in our robustness section that rst place-
ments are approximately random. In addition, we will show that our main e¤ects
persist when adding workgroup xed e¤ects over the rst placement. However, since
these robustness tests yield similar results to analysis using the full dataset with all
placements, we will begin our analysis with the whole, and then turn to individual
parts for our robustness tests.
Since we have a very large sample and nd that our results are consistent when
focusing on quasi-random placement, we also abstract away from separating the
notion of engaging in toxic behavior and being terminated for toxic behavior. For
variety, we will use multiple phrases such as "a worker engages in toxic behavior,"
"he is a toxic worker," and "she is terminated for toxic behavior" interchangeably.
However, strictly speaking, these phrases all mean that the worker is ultimately
terminated for toxic behavior.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
The data were obtained from a company that builds and deploys job-testing software
to large employers. In fact, many of these companies are business-process outsourcers
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(BPOs) that themselves provide a variety of business services (e.g., customer care,
outbound sales, etc.) to their clients. The employees included in the dataset are
all engaged in frontline service positions and paid on an hourly basis. From these
organizations, we were able to obtain and combine three separate datasets on the
basis of employee IDs:
1) Job-testing data: The vendor supplying the data has developed a propri-
etary job test that assesses applicant t for the position for which applying. We were
able to obtain the employee scores on this job test (i.e., Green, Yellow, Red) as well
as the responses to select questions that appeared on the test.
2) Attrition data: All of the companies with which the vendor engages pro-
vide an attrition feed that indicates (among other things) the employees hire date,
termination date (as applicable), reason for termination, their location, job title, and
the supervisors to whom they reported while employed by the rm.
3) Performance data: For a subset of employees included in our analysis, we
were able to obtain daily performance data that represent productivity by measur-
ing the average amount of time an employee required to handle a transaction and
customer satisfaction scores indicating how well she served the customer.
Common employee IDs across all three of these datasets allowed us to merge
them together in order to look at relationships between assessment responses and
an employees likelihood of engaging in toxic behavior. In total, the dataset covers
11 rms, 184 sub-rms (end clients of BPOs), 2,882 workgroups, each reporting to a
particular supervisor, and 58,542 workers. Table 1 provides a summary of our main
variables of interest.
From the assessment data, we were able to obtain several di¤erent measures of
worker quality and predicted performance.
Each employment assessment is designed by an industrial-organizational psy-
chologist and attempts to measure an employees knowledge, skills, and abilities. We
were able to obtain a portion of this proprietary analysis. In particular, we have
a prediction of how service-oriented a given worker might be. This assessment is
based on some questions that could be construed as measuring the degree of "other-
regardingness" of a worker. Here is a sample set of choices presented to applicants:
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1. I like to ask about other peoples well-being
OR
2. I let the past stay in the past
Choosing statement 1 would give subjects a greater service-oriented score. The
variable Low Service Orientation is a dummy variable with value 1 if the assessment
predicts the subject will be poor at service; otherwise, the variable has a value of 0.
Also included in the overall assessment were questions intended to gauge an appli-
cants technical ability. Applicants were asked early in the assessment to self-assess
their computer prociency and they were then tested on several key computer skills.
We compared their self-assessment to their actual computer prociency in order to
develop a measure of applicant self-condence. The variable Skills Condence Level
is constructed by extracting the residual from a regression of actual skills (i.e., mea-
sured skills) on promised skills (i.e., given by the worker). That is, this variable is a
measure of how much the actual skills exceed or fall short of the promised skills.7
We acknowledge that this variable could also be a measure of honesty. Though,
11% of workers actually under-promise their skills level, which would make this an
unlikely measure of dishonesty in such an incentivized setting. Furthermore, if it
becomes apparent after hire that a worker has lower-than-promised skills, there is
a real chance that she will be terminated. Finally, we still nd similar results if we
simply drop the 34% of workers who overpromise performance. Thus, it seems this
variable is more a measure of condence in ones own abilities than a measure of
honesty.
Several questions on the assessment asked applicants about their propensity to
follow rules. We were also able to obtain these questions and the applicant responses
in order to understand whether there was a relationship between the response option
an applicant endorsed and her likelihood to engage in toxic behavior. In particular,
applicants were asked to choose one option from each of the two sets of statements:
7We also calculate Skills Condence as simply the di¤erence between stated and actual skills
without using regression analysis, and the results are similar. In absolute terms, we nd that
roughly 11% of workers promise lower skill than they deliver, 55% deliver as they promise, and 34%
overpromise.
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1. I believe that rules are made to be followed. OR
2. Sometimes its necessary to break the rules to accomplish something
and
1. I like to see new places and experience new things. OR
2. I complete activities according to the rules.
For each of the rule-following variables constructed, a 1 means that the worker
chose the statement that rules should be followed (i.e., the rst statement in the rst
set and the second statement for second set). Thus, receiving a 1 on these dummy
variables means that a subject is stating that he feels rules should be followed.
The Density of Toxic Workers is a ratio that measures the degree of a workers
exposure to other toxic workers. That is, it is the ratio of other workers on a workers
team who are ultimately terminated for being toxic, as described below, divided by
the current number of workers on the workers team. Thus, this measure changes
over time.
For a subset of the dataset, we also have quantitative performance data. We have
a measure of worker output speed and we have the length of time needed to complete
one unit of output. The variable Performance Quantity Time FE is an individual
worker xed e¤ect calculated while regressing the time-per-unit of a worker on a
cubic function of time-on-the-job experience and controls for job position and the
sub-rm where the worker is employed, while achieving a given performance result.
We generally have multiple observations of a workers performance over time; we
refer to each observation of performance measurement as a performance result. In
addition, we have a measure of worker output quality. This variable Performance
Quality is obtained analogously to the variable Performance Quantity Time FE.
Finally, our dependent variable is an indicator variable based on whether the
worker is terminated for toxic behavior. Toxic behavior is dened as involuntary
termination due to an egregious violation of company policy. Examples include sexual
harassment, workplace violence, falsifying documents, fraud, and general workplace
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misconduct. The mean of this variable is approximately 1% across all observations.
However, in terms of per worker, the mean is 4:5% of all observations. In other
words, roughly 1 in 20 workers is ultimately terminated as a toxic worker.
3.2 Hazard Functions
In this section, we show some graphical examples of the hazard rate as a function of
time. In the next section, we will conduct a full analysis with controls. To provide
su¢ cient observations we report the hazards for the rst 365 days, as over 90% of a
workers tenure is under one year.
The rst chart compares the di¤erence in hazard rates of workers with an above-
average (i.e., conf_level=1) and a below-average (i.e., conf_level=0) Skills Con-
dence Level. Those who appear overcondent by overreporting their skill level before
they start the job are more likely to be terminated for toxic behavior across all time.
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Next we estimate the hazard rates of workers that state rules should never be
broken (i.e., rulebreaker1=0) and those that suggest sometimes breaking rules is
necessary (i.e., rulebreaker1=1). Interestingly, those that claim the rules should
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never be broken are more likely to be terminated for breaking the rules as a toxic
worker across, at all times.
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Finally, we compare the hazard rates of those with poor service orientation versus
others. As can be seen, having a poor service orientation makes one more likely to
be terminated for toxicity. If a worker that has a poor service orientation is not
terminated for toxicity in the rst year, thereafter their chance of termination for
toxicity is more similar to other workers. It could be that those workers with poor
service orientation that also engage in toxicity are largely eliminated from the worker
pool by this time.
15
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Although these charts are suggestive, these estimated hazard rates need to be
interpreted with care; they do not include potentially important controls. Further,
we need to consider di¤erent factors simultaneously to determine if they are di¤erent
predictors of toxic workers or if they are a measure of the same underlying force. For
this analysis, we turn to our proportional-hazards regression model.
3.3 Regression Analysis
3.3.1 Baseline
Table 2 reports the results of our baseline regression model.8 For these regressions,
we have a large enough sample to stratify by each sub-rm. This means that each
sub-rm is allowed to have a unique baseline hazard function h (t) : That is, it is as
if we estimate each regression sub-rm by sub-rm. As can be seen, greater reported
Skills Condence results in a greater chance of being terminated for being a toxic
worker. In particular, a one standard deviation in Skills Condence results in an
8For all of our hazard models, we test the proportionality assumption (i.e., that the composite
hazard rate is of the form h (t) f (t)) on the basis of the Schoenfeld residuals after tting a given
model (see Grambsch & Therneau (1994)). In all cases, our model is consistent.
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approximate 15%9 increase in the hazard. That is, conditional on a worker not yet
having been terminated as a toxic worker, a one standard deviation increase in Skills
Condence means that there is some 15% greater hazard of termination due to toxic
behavior. Similarly, those that have a poor service-orientation, have more than a
22% increased hazard of toxic termination. If a worker reports that she believes
rules are made to be followed (as opposed to stating that it is sometimes necessary
to break the rules to accomplish something), she has about 25% greater hazard of
being terminated for actually breaking the rules. Finally, a worker that has a one
standard deviation increase in exposure to toxic workers himself experiences a 46%
increased hazard in being terminated for engaging in toxic behavior.
If we categorize the rst four columns as measures of the person and the last two
columns (including particular job type) as measures of the situation, we can state
what fraction of a toxic workers origin is attributable to the person versus the situ-
ation. In particular, using McFaddens pseudo R2; we calculate that approximately
70% of the explanatory power of the model beyond a model with only an intercept
comes from the person, and the balance (i.e., 30%) from the situation. If each vari-
able in each column mattered equally, we would expect the person to explain 2=3 of
outcome (i.e., 4 out of 6): In the next section, when we only analyze a workers rst
placement, we nd from using McFaddens pseudo R2 that person explains almost
88% of the outcome. In short, at least in our setting, there is important explanatory
power in simply knowing the person, though the situation certainly matters too, and
it seems to matter more over time.
Since we can only measure those cases of toxicity that are discovered and elim-
inated through termination, we could be only partially measuring outcomes. For
the kinds of toxic behavior that were studying (e.g., extreme levels such as sexual
harassment and workplace violence) it seems likely that when such behavior is ex-
hibited, discovery and termination will usually occur. However, in principle, it could
be that cleverer people are better at somehow hiding their behaviors. To explore this
9Recall that to convert estimates into a hazard ratio, simply raise e to the coe¢ cient value. For
example, a coe¢ cient value of :5 results in e:5 ' 1:65: This means a one unit change in the regressor
amounts to a 65% increase in the hazard ratio. Alternatively, a one standard deviation increase,
when such standard deviation is :225; results in a roughly 14:6% increase in the hazard ratio.
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possibility, we were able to obtain the results of two cognitive tests that applicants
take. These tests represents two questions, each quantitatively based with an objec-
tive correct answer. Table 3 reports the results of adding these two measures to our
previous analysis. In doing so, we found that our previous estimates are very similar
and that the cognitive test results do not explain the likelihood of toxic terminations.
In fact, one test has a positive coe¢ cient point estimate and the other test has a
negative one, though neither is signicant.
Ideally, we would like to conduct our analysis after randomly allocating all workers
to workgroups and then observing their experiences and performance over time.
Doing so would average out possible confounds for which it is di¢ cult to control.
For example, perhaps a particular workgroup is better (or worse) at detecting and
eliminating toxic workers. However, based on discussions with company executives,
conditional on a given sub-rm, a workers rst placement tends to be essentially
random. Exactly where an employee is initially placed depends on a variety of
factors outside the control of the worker and the workgroup in which she is placed.
For example, the work ow of a particular operation, demand and supply shocks,
and exactly when a worker turns up looking for a job are all factors determining
to which group a new hire will be assigned. Further, a workgroup supervisor does
not generally choose her groups new worker, so the supervisor does not observe the
new workers predicted job t and other individual characteristic covariates that we
use in our analysis. However, a workers second placement may not be essentially
random. Thus, for a robustness test, we now redo our above analysis, but only for a
workers rst placement.
3.3.2 First Placement Only
Table 4 reports an analysis based only on an employees rst placement. As can be
seen, the results are broadly similar to the case in which all worker placements are
included. Upon closer inspection, we see that the magnitude of the coe¢ cient of
the toxic worker density is about 20% smaller. One possible explanation for this is
that the exposure to toxic workers has a cumulative e¤ect: the same exposure over
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a greater period of time has a greater adverse e¤ect on a worker.
In principle, we can test statistically whether a placement is di¤erent from ran-
dom. One common method includes comparing covariates across treatments, where
treatments normally total two. However, in our setting, a "treatment" is the ini-
tial placement in each workgroup, which amounts to 2; 882 treatments, making a
comparison cumbersome. Further, one can only consider relationships pair-by-pair.
However, another common method that also allows the covariates to be interdepen-
dent is using a logit or probit model to predict treatment. Of course, this method
only works when there are two di¤erent treatments; again, we have 2; 882 treatments.
However, we can analyze a multinomial equivalent where each outcome is considered
an unordered outcome of being placed in a given workgroup. We need su¢ cient
observations in order to estimate how each covariate contributes to the likelihood of
being placed in a particular workgroup. In the end, we can estimate how covariates
predict 985 workgroup placements.
The following table reports the results of these regressions.
Low Service Skills Rules: Rules:
Orientation Confidence Sometimes Break Prefer Adventure
Number of Workgroups Significant at 5% 47 113 50 101
Fraction of Estimated Workgroups (985) 4.77% 11.47% 5.08% 10.25%
Fraction of All Workgroups (2,882) 1.63% 3.92% 1.73% 3.50%
We nd that in 47 of the 985 cases Bad Job t predicts in which workgroup a
worker is placed in, which represents almost 5% of workgroups. Skills Condence
is signicant over 11% of the time, whereas Rules covariates are signicant at 5%
and 10% of the time, respectively. If all placements were generated at random, we
would expect each covariate to be signicant at the 5% level, 5% of the time, on
average. When we consider the full dataset we are using to estimate e¤ects in our
main analysis, covariates are only signicant less than 3% of the time, on average.
The reason we cannot estimate covariate e¤ects on the entire dataset of workgroups
is that generally there are too few observations for a particular workgroup, which
also means we do no expect such workgroups to create statistical aberrations on their
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own.
We ran an additional robustness test to explicitly control for a employees work-
group during her rst placement. In particular, we run a linear panel model with
workgroup xed e¤ects for a workers rst placement.10 Here, we collapse the ex-
posure to toxic workers as an average exposure over the placement, whereas before
this was the current-period exposure. Results are reported in Table 5. The ndings
with this linear model are very similar in terms of signicance and magnitude when
compared with our hazard models, with the exception of the e¤ect of Toxic exposure
. In terms of magnitudes, a worker that is predicted to have Low Service Orientation
has an additional :9% chance of becoming a terminated toxic worker, which is an
increase of 20% from the baseline toxic worker rate of 4:5%: A one standard deviation
in Skills Condence results in a roughly 11% chance of becoming a terminated toxic
worker. Those who state that rules should never be broken are 20% more likely to
be terminated for toxic behavior. A one standard deviation increase in exposure to
other toxic workers induces a roughly 98% increased chance of a worker becoming a
toxic worker. Finally, In short, these e¤ects are consistent with those found with our
previous models.
3.3.3 Toxic Worker Performance
For a subset of the data, we have performance data on the workers. For this group,
as discussed in section 3:1; we have a measure of each employees time to produce
one unit of quantity and a measure of their quality of work. We then use this data
to calculate a worker-specic xed e¤ect of each of these measures, which we refer
to as Performance Quantity Time FE and Performance Quality FE, respectively.
Looking simply at mean FE values, we nd that the average Performance Quan-
tity Time FE is less for those ultimately red for toxicity than those that are not
toxic (t-test with unequal variance yields a p-value= :0376): That is, toxic workers
are more productive than those that are not ultimately terminated for toxicity. When
10Note that we do not control for position type in these specications. A particular workgroup
typically consists of the same set of position types, and thus the variance matrix naturally becomes
unusable when we do attempt to control for position type simultaneously with workgroup.
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we consider Performance Quality FE, we nd that toxic workers have lesser quality
than non-toxic workers; however, results do not quite reach conventional levels of
statistical signicance (p-value= :1233): Of course these are simply means and we
should consider analysis with controls. In particular, we need to relate the produc-
tivity of workers and whether or not that worker is terminated for toxic behavior
while controlling for the previous factors that are important for identifying toxicity.
Table 6 reports the results of introducing these additional measures to our original
analysis reported in Table 2. The other variables of interest previously studied are
qualitatively the same as in table 2, although the levels of signicance are diminished
for this considerably smaller sample size.
Similar to our ndings of comparing the means, those who are terminated for
engaging in toxic behavior are more productive than non-toxic employees; equiva-
lently, those who are slower (i.e., large values of Performance Quantity Time FE)
are less likely to be toxic. In terms of magnitude, a one standard deviation in time
per unit of production results in a 56% reduction in the hazard of becoming a toxic
worker. However, those workers with poorer quality performance are more likely to
be toxic. Here, a one standard deviation increase in the quality of production results
in a 27% decrease in the hazard. With controls, this relationship is not signicant
at conventional levels.
It might seem that toxic workers are simply those that trade work quality for
speed and those workers that produce higher quality must also be slower workers.
However, this is not the case. Clearly, there is a natural tradeo¤ between speed and
quality of work. Yet, there are almost 50% more workers that produce high quality
work quickly (32:4% of workers) than those that produce low quality work quickly
(23% of workers). Thus, although toxic workers are quicker than the average worker,
they are not necessarily more productive in a quality-adjusted sense. In the long run,
these kinds of workers are not likely to improve overall organizational performance.
Finding Superstars vs. Losing Toxic Workers With performance data we
can also compare the strategy of nding a "superstar" worker versus avoiding a toxic
one. As discussed in the introduction, many rms, as well as the extant literature are
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focused on nding and keeping the next star performer, whereas much less attention
is devoted to avoiding toxic workers. Given a rm with limited resources, which
strategy is more fruitful? Although we certainly cannot answer this question for all
possible settings, we can asses this trade-o¤ for our setting.
To generate a straightforward comparison of the value of each of these focuses,
we quantify the value of a star performer by identifying the cost savings from her
increased output level. That is, without such a star performer, a rm would have
to hire additional workers to achieve the same output they enjoy when they have a
superstar. In the table below, the column "Hire a Superstar" reports the cost saving
based on the top 1%; 5%; 10%; and 25% performers. We calculate the percent in
increased performance for each of these performance levels and multiply it by the
average worker salary, based on company records. This is an upper bound of the cost-
savings from hiring a Superstar since increased performance is often accompanied by
increased wages.
For comparison, we report in the "Avoid a Toxic Worker" column the induced
turnover cost of a toxic worker, based on company gures. Induced turnover cost
captures the expense of replacing additional workers lost in response to the presence
of a toxic worker on a team. The total estimated cost is $12,489 and does not include
other potential costs, such as litigation, regulatory penalty, and reduced employee
morale. Also not included are the secondary costs of turnover that come from a
new workers learning curve: a time of lower productivity precedes a return to higher
productivity. Thus, this estimate is likely a lower bound on the average cost of a
toxic worker, at least for this empirical setting.
Hire a Avoid a
Superstar Rank Superstar Toxic Worker
top 25%  $      1,951  $          12,489
top 10%  $      3,251  $          12,489
top 5%  $      3,875  $          12,489
top 1%  $      5,303  $          12,489
Cost-savings
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In comparing the two costs, even if a rm could replace an average worker with
one who performs in the top 1%; it would still be better o¤ by replacing a toxic
worker with an average worker by more than two-to-one. That is, avoiding a toxic
worker (or converting them to an average worker) provides more benet than nding
and retaining a superstar. Assuming that it is no more costly to avoid a toxic
worker (or replace them with an average worker) than it is to nd, hire, and retain
a superstar, it is also more protable to do the former over the latter. Of course,
this di¤erential between the superstar and toxic worker might not be as drastic in
other settings. Nonetheless, nding a top 1% worker can be both di¢ cult and costly.
Further, sometimes "stars" that hiring managers discover via another rm are not
able to transport their same elevated level of productivity to their next employer
(Groysberg (2012)). Finally, as some high-stakes nance workers recently showed
us leading up to the Great Recession, high-ying lines of work can generate both
superstars and toxic workers with enormous impacts.
4 Discussion
Based on our analysis, we have a variety of takeaways for managers. From our
study, it seems clear that toxic workers originate both as a function of preexisting
characteristics and the environment in which they work. In particular, we found
consistent evidence that those who seem overcondent in their abilities, who are
poorly service-oriented, and who claim rules should be followed, are more likely to
become toxic workers and break the rules. One strategy for hiring managers is to
screen potential workers for these traits to reduce the chance of hiring toxic workers.
Of course, there are more dimensions to a good (and bad) hire beyond whether
or not candidates have a higher propensity to become toxic. Worker productivity
is also important. Interestingly, we found that toxic workers are apparently more
productive, at least in terms of the quantity of output. This could also explain how
toxic workers are able to remain in an organization for as long as they do. For
example, an investment bank with a rogue trader who is making the rm millions
in prots might be tempted to look the other way when the trader is found to be
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overstepping the rules. Pierce and Snyder (2013) nd unethical workers enjoy longer
tenures. However, we also found evidence that the quality of production for these
workers is lower. This means that eventually, the value of the higher productivity
will be diminished, perhaps drastically, as the consequences of lower-quality work
are manifested.
This performance nding suggests that toxic workers are similar to what Jack
Welch described as "Type 4" workers those that deliver on the numbers but do
not have the right values. Welch claimed that while di¢ cult to do, it was critical
to remove such workers: "People are removed for having the wrong values...we dont
even talk about the numbers" (Bartlett and Wozny (2005)). Thus, we nd evidence
that such a policy one that removes the "big shots" and "tyrants" seems to be one
that would lead to more productive organizations in general.11 Similarly, Delong and
Vijayaraghavan (2003) argue that the top performers are not always the best workers
to pursue over even the average worker, as the former can also create organizational
issues, including reckless behavior.
Although we do nd certain preexisting traits that predict toxic workers, this does
not mean that those traits were always present in the worker. Though it is beyond
the scope of this paper, it would be interesting to learn to what extent work-life
experiences breed the preexisting traits that we have found to lead to toxic workers.
It would be very valuable to discover what rms can currently do to limit the chances
of converting a "normal" worker to a future toxic worker.
In this vein, we did nd that a workers environment also substantially inuenced
her propensity to become a toxic worker. We documented that holding a particular
type of position, as well as exposure to other toxic workers negatively inuenced the
likelihood of one becoming toxic. Hence, this suggests that managing toxic workers
is not simply a matter of screening them out of the rm, but also minding the work
environment.
11We thank Tarun Khanna for this Jack Welch example.
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5 Conclusion
In the end, a good or bad hiring decision is multidimensional (Lazear & Oyer (2007)
and Hermalin (2013)). We have identied several personality and situational factors
that lead to a worker engaging in objective toxic behavior. Knowledge of these
factors can be used to better manage for toxic workers. We have also discovered some
important e¤ects of toxic workers. However, there are surely additional traits that
could be used to identify toxic workers. Similarly, it would be helpful to know which
other environmental factors nudge an otherwise normal worker towards becoming a
toxic worker and possibly creating the preexisting workplace conditions that lead to
toxic behavior. Future research can shed light on these questions. This latter focus
seems particularly important, because to the extent that we can reduce a workers
propensity to become toxic, we are helping not only the rm, but the worker himself,
those around him, and the potential rms where that employee may work in the
future. Since we found some evidence that a toxic worker can have more impact on
performance than a "superstar," it may be that spending more time limiting negative
impacts on an organization might improve everyones outcome to a greater extent
than only focusing on increasing positive impacts. We have taken a rst step in
exploring this notion and hope that we witness future progress in this area.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Low Service Orientation 248370 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00
Skills Confidence Level 248370 -0.01 0.23 -0.24 0.92
Rules: Sometimes Break Them 248370 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00
Rules: Prefer Adventure 248370 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Density of Toxic Workers 248370 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.80
Performance Quantity Time FE 62618 -32.77 213.11 -462.94 1488.31
Performance Quality FE 20089 -0.05 0.13 -0.91 0.23
Terminated for Toxic Behavior 248370 0.01 0.10 0 1
Table 2: Terminations as a Function of Worker Type and Environment  
(All Placements) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Worker and Environment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low Service Orientation 0.2808*** 0.2090*** 0.2077*** 0.2047*** 0.2030*** 0.2023***
(5.30) (3.81) (3.78) (3.71) (3.69) (3.68)
Skills Confidence Level 0.5215*** 0.5206*** 0.5177*** 0.5033*** 0.5034***
(6.42) (6.41) (6.36) (6.18) (6.17)
Rules: Sometimes Break Them -0.2373*** -0.2284*** -0.2247*** -0.2272***
(-3.75) (-3.55) (-3.49) (-3.53)
Rules: Prefer Adventure -0.0274 -0.0193 -0.0184
(-0.67) (-0.47) (-0.45)
Density of Toxic Workers 2.5581*** 2.5182***
(11.74) (11.49)
Position Controls No No No No No Yes
Log Likelihood -18446.4880 -18427.3077 -18419.9216 -18419.6990 -18372.5281 -18368.2087
N 246599 246599 246599 246599 246599 246599
Cox proportional hazard model used for estimation
Non parametric hazard functions estimated at the sub-firm level
Z scores reported in parentheses based on standard errors clustered at the worker level
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
Outcome: Terminated Toxic Worker
Table 3: Cognitive Scores and Terminations  
(All Placements) 
 
 
 
 
 
Worker and Environment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Test I Correct 0.0051 0.0164 0.0200 0.0201 0.0304 0.0258
(0.10) (0.32) (0.39) (0.39) (0.59) (0.50)
Cognitive Test II Correct -0.1092* -0.0777 -0.0708 -0.0693 -0.0581 -0.0599
(-1.76) (-1.25) (-1.14) (-1.11) (-0.93) (-0.96)
Low Service Orientation 0.2730*** 0.2051*** 0.2043*** 0.2015*** 0.2004*** 0.1996***
(5.12) (3.73) (3.71) (3.65) (3.64) (3.63)
Skills Confidence Level 0.5126*** 0.5129*** 0.5104*** 0.4982*** 0.4978***
(6.27) (6.28) (6.23) (6.08) (6.06)
Rules: Sometimes Break Them -0.2355*** -0.2273*** -0.2241*** -0.2264***
(-3.72) (-3.53) (-3.48) (-3.52)
Rules: Prefer Adventure -0.0257 -0.0180 -0.0169
(-0.63) (-0.44) (-0.41)
Density of Toxic Workers 2.5560*** 2.5151***
(11.71) (11.45)
Position Controls No No No No No Yes
Log Likelihood -18444.8609 -18426.5004 -18419.2375 -18419.0419 -18371.9870 -18367.6758
N 246599 246599 246599 246599 246599 246599
Outcome: Terminated Toxic Worker
Cox proportional hazard model used for estimation
Non parametric hazard functions estimated at the sub-firm level
Z scores reported in parentheses based on standard errors clustered at the worker level
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
Table 4: Terminations as a Function of Worker Type and Environment  
(First Placements Only) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Worker and Environment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low Service Orientation 0.3279*** 0.2617*** 0.2608*** 0.2638*** 0.2595*** 0.2597***
(5.66) (4.35) (4.33) (4.37) (4.30) (4.30)
Skills Confidence Level 0.4574*** 0.4573*** 0.4603*** 0.4545*** 0.4513***
(4.96) (4.96) (4.98) (4.91) (4.86)
Rules: Sometimes Break Them -0.2058*** -0.2146*** -0.2111*** -0.2097***
(-2.95) (-3.02) (-2.96) (-2.95)
Rules: Prefer Adventure 0.0272 0.0311 0.0300
(0.59) (0.67) (0.65)
Density of Toxic Workers 2.1341*** 2.1409***
(7.47) (7.48)
Position Controls No No No No No Yes
Log Likelihood -13661.0461 -13649.4261 -13644.9028 -13644.7302 -13627.5793 -13626.9476
N 190178 190178 190178 190178 190178 190178
Cox proportional hazard model used for estimation
Non parametric hazard functions estimated at the sub-firm level
Z scores reported in parentheses based on standard errors clustered at the worker level
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
Outcome: Terminated Toxic Worker
Table 5: Linear Model of Terminations with Workgroup Fixed Effects  
(First Placements Only) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Worker and Environment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low Service Orientation 0.0128*** 0.0093*** 0.0093*** 0.0097*** 0.0091***
(4.04) (2.86) (2.87) (2.96) (2.82)
Skills Confidence Level 0.0243*** 0.0243*** 0.0246*** 0.0208***
(5.07) (5.06) (5.11) (4.39)
Rules: Sometimes Break Them -0.0074*** -0.0083*** -0.0076***
(-2.74) (-3.01) (-2.79)
Rules: Prefer Adventure 0.0028 0.0025
(1.33) (1.23)
Avg Density of Toxic Workers 1.1078***
(20.70)
R Squared 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.045 0.070
Adjusted R Squared 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.049
N 44710 44710 44710 44710 44710
Outcome: Terminated Toxic Worker
t statistics reported in parentheses based on standard errors clustered at the workgroup level
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
Table 6: Terminations with Worker Performance  
(All Placements) 
 
Worker and Environment (1) (2) (3)
Performance Quantity Time FE -0.0036*** -0.0039***
(-6.79) (-5.33)
Performance Quality FE -2.1925*** -2.4419***
(-4.90) (-5.28)
Low Service Orientation 0.0383 -0.0620 -0.0853
(0.41) (-0.41) (-0.55)
Skills Confidence Level 0.4069*** 0.4597** 0.4686**
(2.93) (2.50) (2.54)
Rules: Sometimes Break Them -0.0215 -0.0226 0.0192
(-0.20) (-0.14) (0.12)
Rules: Prefer Adventure -0.0823 -0.2627*** -0.2449**
(-1.17) (-2.64) (-2.44)
Density of Toxic Workers 1.5359*** 1.7591*** 1.5971***
(5.21) (5.83) (5.15)
Position Controls Yes Yes yes
Log Likelihood -5859.5624 -3233.1108 -3165.6394
N 62419 19983 19751
Outcome: Terminated Toxic Worker
Cox proportional hazard model used for estimation
Non parmetric hazard functions estimated at the sub-firm level
Z scores reported in parentheses are based
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
on standard errors clustered at the worker level
